Normatividad lógica y psicología del razonamiento
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.2025.47.e0128Palavras-chave:
Normatividad de la Lógica, Psicología del razonamiento, L´ógica mental, Modelos mentales, Intuición lógicaResumo
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la relevancia de la psicología del razonamiento deductivo para el debate sobre la normatividad de la lógica. Presento tres teorías psicológicas que, a su modo, distinguen entre inferencias lógicas “fáciles” y “difíciles”. Luego, argumento que algunas de las dificultades más comunes para entender la normatividad de la lógica pueden resolverse usando estas distinciones. Concluyo que es posible un diálogo virtuoso entre la psicología del razonamiento y la normatividad de la lógica.
Downloads
Referências
Brisson, J., Schaeken, W., Markovits, H., & De Neys, W. (2018). Conflict detection and logical complexity. Psychologica Belgica, 58(1), 318-322.
De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 28-38.
Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and Reasoning. Psychology Press.
Evans, J., Barston, J., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory and Cognition, 11(3), 295-306.
Field, H. (2009). Hartry Field: What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 83(1), 251-268.
Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Rationality for Mortals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, B. (2002). Basic Logical Knowledge. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement(51), 279-304.
Handley, S., Howarth, S., & Trippas, D. (2022). The author is a psychologist or a kangaroo: Exploring the bounds of logical intuition. SSRN Electronic Journal.
Hanna, R. (2006). Rationality and Logic. The MIT Press.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View. The MIT Press.
Henle, M. (1962). On the relation between logic and thinking. Psychological Review, 69(4), 366–378.
J.B. Evans, J. B. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 295-306.
Johnson-Laird, P. (1983). Mental Models. Harvard University Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. (2001). Mental models and deduction. Trends in Cognitive Science, 5(10), 434-442.
Johnson-Laird, P. (2010). Mental models and human reasoning. PNAS, 107(43), 18243-18250.
Leech, J. (2015). Logic and the Laws of Thought. Philosophers' Imprint, 15(12), 1-27.
MacFarlane, J. (2004). In what sense (if any) is logic normative for thought? Retrieved from https://johnmacfarlane.net/normativity_of_logic.pdf
Marra, A., & De Benedetto, M. (2024). Logical norms as defeasible obligations. Inquiry.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian Rationality: the probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Books.
Oza, M. (2020). The Value of Thinking and the Normativity of Logic. Philosophers' Imprint, 20(25), 1-23.
Piaget, J. (1949). Traité de Logique. Armand Collin.
Rips, L. (1994). The Psychology of Proof. The MIT Press.
Russell, G. (2020). Logic isn't normative. Inquiry, 63(3-4), 371-388.
Stei, E. (2020). Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism. Inquiry, 63(3-4), 411-432.
Steinberger, F. (2019). Consequence and Normative Guidance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(2), 306-328.
Tajer, D. (2022). A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism. Inquiry.
Tajer, D. (2022). The normative autonomy of logic. Erkenntnis, 87, 2661–2684.
Trippas, D., Thompson, V., & Handley, S. (2017). When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias. Memory and Cognition, 45, 539–552.
Wason, P. (1966). Reasoning. In B. Foss, New Horizons in Psychology (pp. 135-151). Penguin Books.
Whiting, D. (2010). Should I believe the truth? Dialectica, 64(2), 213-224.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Kegan Paul, Trench, Tubner.
Downloads
Publicado
Edição
Seção
Licença
Direitos autorais (c) 1969 Diego Tajer
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
