La fuente de la normatividad lógica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.2025.47.e0133Palavras-chave:
Normatividad, Pluralismo, Constitutivo, Lógica, InternalismoResumo
La idea tradicional de que los principios lógicos son normativos ha sido cuestionada por quienes creen que la fuente de la normatividad lógica es externa: afirman que la normatividad proviene de principios epistémicos (Russell, 2020), éticos (Tolley, 2006) o de alguna otra fuente. En este trabajo señalo algunos problemas de esta visión externalista de la normatividad lógica. En contraste, destaco las virtudes teóricas de la visión internalista de la normatividad lógica, esto es, la idea de que los principios lógicos son intrínsecamente normativos.
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Referências
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