On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i43.11894Keywords:
Appraisal, cognition, emotion, incompatibilityAbstract
During the last decades an intense debate has developed around the characterization of emotions, in which two approaches were presented as incompatible with each other: the somatic and the cognitive perspective of emotions. In this paper I propose to evaluate whether these are in fact irreconcilable positions, starting from the systematization of the theses that have identified each of these perspectives. Having disarticulated some points of divergence, I finally consider in what sense the debate remains irreducible.
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