Sobre la irreductibilidad del debate entre teorías somáticas y cognitivas de las emociones

Autores/as

  • Andrea F. Melamed Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i43.11894

Palabras clave:

Cognición, emoción, incompatibilidad, valoración

Resumen

Durante las últimas décadas, se ha desarrollado un intenso debate en torno a la caracterización de las emociones en el que se perfilaron dos enfoques que se presentaban como incompatibles entre sí: la perspectiva somática y la perspectiva cognitiva de las emociones. En este trabajo me propongo evaluar si estas son en efecto posiciones irreconciliables, a partir de la sistematización de las tesis que le han dado identidad a cada una de estas perspectivas. Habiendo desarticulado algunos puntos de divergencia, finalmente, advierto en qué sentido considero que el debate se mantiene irreducible.

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Biografía del autor/a

Andrea F. Melamed, Universidad de Buenos Aires

 Licenciada y doctora en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Fue becaria doctoral CONICET (2012–2017). Actualmente es becaria posdoctoral en el IIF (SADAF/CONICET) y docente en la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Entre sus áreas de interés están la filosofía de la mente y la filosofía de la ciencia, más específicamente, la filosofía de la psicología. Sus investigaciones se han publicado en capítulos de libros y en revistas científicas como Ludus Vitalis y Disputatio

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Publicado

30-06-2022

Cómo citar

Melamed, A. F. (2022). Sobre la irreductibilidad del debate entre teorías somáticas y cognitivas de las emociones. Tópicos. Revista De Filosofía De Santa Fe, (43), 200–223. https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i43.11894